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RECONSIDERING THE STANDARD FOR
ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT CASES IN
VIEW OF RECENT GUIDANCE FROM THE
SUPREME COURT
Howard Wisnia† & Thomas Jackman††
This article examines whether the jurisprudence of the enhanced
damages provision found in 35 U.S.C. § 284 should be modified in light
of recent Supreme Court decisions that have altered the jurispudence
of the attorney’s fees provision found in 35 U.S.C. § 285. The authors
conclude that a revision is needed to the standard for determining
whether to award enchanced damages under § 284 and that juries as
opposed to judges should determine whether to grant such an award as
well as the amount of the award.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.1 and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health
Management Systems, Inc.2 significantly modified the jurisprudence
for determining whether a patent lawsuit is “exceptional,” thus
qualifying the prevailing party for attorney’s fees under § 285 of the
Patent Act.3 These two decisions addressed the Federal Circuit’s multiyear jurisprudence on the appropriate standard of proof4 for

1. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
2. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2013) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.”).
4. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 n.4 (2011) (discussing how
the term “burden of proof” has been used synonymously with “standard of proof,” but that the
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exceptional-case determinations under § 285 and their proper
characterization as either a question of fact or law. In discussing § 285,
the Supreme Court did not mention § 284, the damages provision of the
Patent Act that provides for the recovery of “damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement”5 and increased damages for willful
infringement.6 Courts have historically treated the discretionarydamage awards of § 284 and § 285 similarly, often citing precedent
concerning one section in the application of the other.7 The reasoning
in Octane Fitness and Highmark suggests that current Federal Circuit
§ 284 jurisprudence should be modified.8 Specifically, willfulness need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (as opposed to clear
and convincing evidence), and is a question of fact entirely for the jury.
This article also concludes that there is a Seventh Amendment right to
have the jury perform the discretionary adjustment of damages under
§ 284. Finally, this article considers the implications of these
modifications to § 284 jurisprudence.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT MODIFIES THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
35 U.S.C. § 285
A. Octane Fitness

In Octane, the Supreme Court revised the application of 35 U.S.C
§ 285, a fee-shifting provision for patent litigation to be applied in
“exceptional” cases.9 The parties in Octane were manufacturers of
exercise equipment.10 ICON sued Octane for patent infringement, but
lost on summary judgment for non-infringement.11 Octane then moved
Supreme Court uses “standard of proof” to specify “how difficult it will be for the party bearing
the burden of persuasion to convince the jury of the facts in its favor”).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013).
6. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Absent a statutory
guide, we have held that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful
infringement.”).
7. See, e.g., iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
objective baselessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys' fees against a non-prevailing
plaintiff . . . is identical to the objective recklessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys'
fees against an accused infringer for § 284 willful infringement actions.”); Bard Peripheral
Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same).
8. A concurring opinion in a post-Octane Fitness/Highmark Federal Circuit decision on
willfulness agrees that § 284 jurisprudence requires further review in light of the Supreme Court’s
changes to § 285 jurisprudence. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring).
9. 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014); 35 U.S.C § 285 (2013).
10. 134 S. Ct. at 1754.
11. Id. at 1755.
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for attorney’s fees under § 285, but the district court, applying existing
Federal Circuit jurisprudence, declined to award fees because ICON’s
claim was not “objectively baseless” or “brought in subjective bad
faith.”12 The Federal Circuit affirmed and declined to “revisit the settled
standard for exceptionality.”13
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Court’s decision, finding
that the “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith”
requirements were inconsistent with the statute.14 The Supreme Court
also suggested that preponderance of the evidence, not clear and
convincing evidence,” was the proper standard of proof under § 285.15
It explained that the “simple discretionary inquiry” required by § 285
did not impose “a specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high
one.”16 The Supreme Court noted that “patent-infringement litigation
has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence,” as this
standard “allows both parties to share the risk of error in roughly equal
fashion.”17 Significantly, the Supreme Court found that the analytical
framework of Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. (PRE), which was the foundation of the
Federal Circuit’s construction of § 285, had “no roots in the text of
§ 285.”18 Important to our inquiry, the Federal Circuit had also been
relying on PRE in its § 284 analysis,19 despite the fact that PRE deals
with the “sham” exception to the doctrine of antitrust immunity for
petitioning the government and the Supreme court has now suggested
it is not relevant to patent law. 20
B. Highmark
In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.,21
released the same day as Octane, the Supreme Court found that the
Federal Circuit had applied the wrong standard of review to the district
12. Id.
13. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F. App’x 57, 65 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
14. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756–57.
15. Id. at 1758.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 1757 (discussing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)).
19. See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing PRE as support for its holding with respect to § 284); PRE, 508 U.S. at
49–50.
20. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1757.
21. Id. at 1744 (2014).
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court’s § 285 findings.22 The accused infringer, Highmark, had moved
for attorney’s fees under § 285 after prevailing on its motion for
summary judgment for non-infringement.23 The district court granted
the motion for attorney’s fees, but the Federal Circuit reversed,
applying de novo review to the district court’s findings.24 The Supreme
Court found that the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion
because, “[a]lthough questions of law may in some cases be relevant to
the § 285 inquiry, that inquiry general is, at heart, rooted in factual
determinations.”25
The Supreme Court’s analysis of § 285 suggests that the Federal
Circuit has applied the wrong standard of proof under 35 U.S.C. § 284.
These decisions also suggest that the recent shift by the Federal Circuit
to treat willfulness determinations as a matter of law is incorrect.26
This article examines the history of treble damages for patent
infringement in the U.S., attempts to locate the source of the clear-andconvincing standard required by current Federal Circuit jurisprudence
for obtaining these damages, and explores the jurisprudence behind
similar willfulness provisions to see if clear and convincing evidence
is the appropriate standard of proof for awarding enhanced damages.
This article also examines the propriety of the Federal Circuit’s recent
treatment of willfulness as a question of law instead of a question of
fact.
II. THE HISTORY OF ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT CASES
Enhanced damages for patent infringement dates back to 1793 in
the U.S., just three years after the first session of the U.S. Congress
passed the Patent Act of 1790.27 The Patent Act of 1793 set
infringement damages as “a sum, that shall be at least equal to three
times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to

22. Id. at 1749.
23. Id. at 1747.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1749 (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006–
07 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a proper willfulness determination is at least partially a matter
of law, with the court acting as a gatekeeper for the issue); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring and observing that
the jurisprudence of § 284 is potentially in need of reform). As discussed below, Judge O’Malley’s
suggestion that enhanced damages should be a matter entirely for the judge may be inconsistent
with the Seventh Amendment. See infra Part IV(A).
27. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2013)); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
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other persons, the use of the said invention.”28 This mandatory trebling
remained largely unaltered until the Patent Act of 1836, which provided
that once a patentee obtained a favorable verdict, “it shall be in the
power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount
found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff,
not exceeding three times the amount thereof.”29 The provision for
discretionary enhanced damages has remained part of the Patent Act
ever since.30 The current provision provides that once a patentee has
obtained a finding of infringement, the court may “increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”31
III. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
STANDARD OF PROOF FOR WILLFULNESS DETERMINATIONS
A. The Federal Circuit Era
The history of requiring clear and convincing evidence of willful
infringement to obtain enhanced damages under § 284 is not nearly as
straightforward as the history of § 284 itself. Nothing in 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 or its predecessors mentions a particular standard of proof. Yet
the Federal Circuit has required clear and convincing evidence of
willful infringement for enhanced damages under § 284 for almost 30
years.32
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., decided in
1985, three years after the Federal Circuit was established, is the
genesis of this requirement in the Federal Circuit.33 The court stated
that “[t]he jurisprudence . . . uniformly requires clear and convincing
evidence in support of increased damages.”34 Yet, the Shatterproof
court cited no support for its holding. Nonetheless, future Federal
Circuit decisions on the issue all cite backwards in a chain to
Shatterproof.35
28. Patent Act of 1793 § 5, 1 Stat. at 322.
29. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2013)).
30. This provision was last modified by the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 284,
66 Stat. 792, 813 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 284).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013).
32. See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); Bard
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997), Pall
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The exception is Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
decided in 1986, one year after Shatterproof.36 The parties had
submitted jointly prepared questions to the jury in the district court,
which the Federal Circuit held “recognized the appropriate burdens to
be met by each of the parties as well as the corresponding standard of
proof with respect to each issue.”37 One of these questions stated that
the standard of proof for willful infringement was the preponderance
of the evidence.38 The significance of this holding was quickly
diminished by E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., decided in 1988, in which the court “conclude[d] that
Orthokinetics never intended to change the proper test stated in
Shatterproof.”39 Nonetheless, it suggests that not all judges initially
agreed (or assumed) that clear and convincing was the appropriate
standard.
B. The Pre-Federal Circuit Era
In searching for the uniform jurisprudence of Shatterproof, a
review of the preceding two-hundred years of patent cases revealed that
courts have historically found evidence of willful infringement to be
either sufficient or insufficient without explaining the specific
evidentiary standard of proof it applied.40 By the mid-20th century,
courts began discussing which party bore the burden of proof (i.e., that
the burden was on the patentee to show willful infringement), but had
not yet addressed the evidentiary standard.41
Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995), E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988), Shatterproof, 758 F.2d at
628).
36. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 1569.
38. Id. at 1583.
39. 849 F.2d 1430, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Allen v. Deacon, 21 F. 122, 123 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (“I do not think the
infringement after notice in question is of such a willful nature as to incur the penalty of a recovery
for all prior infringements without notice of the patent.”); Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 704
(1890) (stating, without discussing the appropriate standard of proof, that “[i]t is conceded that
these exceptions raise two points, namely, that the infringement was not willful [sic].”); Lowell
Mfg. Co. v. Hogg, 70 F. 787, 787 (C.C.D. Mass. 1895) (holding, without a discussion of the
standard of proof, that “under the circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that his
infringements were willful.”); Phila. Rubber Works Co. v. U.S. Rubber Reclaiming Works, 276 F.
600, 609 (D.N.Y. 1920) (holding, without stating the standard of proof, that “I am unable to sustain
plaintiff’s claim the infringement in question was wanton and willful.”); Muther v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 21 F.2d 773, 780 (D. Mass. 1927) (holding, without stating the standard of proof, that
“[t]he infringement was willful, deliberate, and intentional, and a case seems to be presented for
the exercise of the discretionary power of the court to increase plaintiff’s legal damages.”).
41. See, e.g., Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1953).
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In its 1982 decision Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Lab.,42 the
Seventh Circuit lumped § 285 and § 284 together and stated, “such
awards are not to be given to a prevailing party as a matter of course
but only upon an ‘unambiguous showing of extraordinary
misconduct.’”43 This holding implies a higher evidentiary standard than
preponderance of the evidence.
The Novo court cited a 1972 Seventh Circuit opinion, Airtex Corp
v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., to support its holding.44 However, the
Airtex case concerned a request for attorney fees under § 285, not
enhanced damages under § 284.45 The Airtex court relied on a line of
cases46 that all converged on the idea that since fraud must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence, it is also the correct standard for
obtaining attorney’s fees because the request is often supported by
allegations of fraud.47 Airtex agreed with this reasoning despite
acknowledging that the “exceptional case” justification under § 285 is
not limited to fraud.48
A close look at the first case in this line, Armour & Co. v. Wilson
& Co.,49 reveals that the later cases interpreted it incorrectly. Armour
examined whether an award of attorney fees was appropriate in the
context of accusations of inequitable conduct and fraud by the
patentee.50 The court in Armour first overturned findings related to
fraud, concluding that the evidence put forth failed to meet the “clear
and convincing evidence” standard.51 The court then overturned the
district court’s award of fees because “the basis of this award was not
clearly stated” as required and that in any event there was “no proper
basis for an award of attorney fees in this case.”52 It never mentioned
the appropriate standard of proof required to obtain attorney fees under
§ 285.

42. 677 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1982).
43. Novo Industri, 677 F.2d at 1211 (emphasis added) (quoting Airtex Corp. v. Shelley
Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 155 (7th Cir. 1976)).
44. Id.
45. Airtex, 536 F.2d at 155.
46. Id. (citing Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 484 F.2d 905,
909 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing Sarkes Tarizan, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 351 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1965)
(citing Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 274 F.2d 143, 148 (7th Cir. 1960)))).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 274 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960).
50. Armour, 274 F.2d at 148.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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While Armour held that fraud and inequitable conduct must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence,53 it lends no support for the
proposition that fee awards under § 285, much less treble damages
under § 284, require clear and convincing evidence. The cases that
followed Armour were wrong for citing it for such a proposition. Novo
compounded the error by citing Airtex as a basis that both § 284 and
§ 285 require a higher standard of proof.54
C. The Federal Circuit Likely Adopted an Incorrect Standard of
Proof
It is one thing to require a party to show egregious or malicious
behavior meriting fees or treble damages. It is quite another to require
that this egregious behavior be proven by clear and convincing
evidence as opposed to the preponderance of the evidence. The first
requirement ensures consideration of the kinds of improper behavior
envisioned by the statute. The second requirement deals with the risk
of error, which is an entirely different issue. The Supreme Court
reiterated in Octane that preponderance of the evidence is the
appropriate standard of proof in patent litigation because the risk of
error under § 285 should be shared equally between the plaintiff and
the defendant.55 Section 284 should be treated the same in this respect.
This is further supported by a review of analogous provisions, which
show that the law expects parties to share the risks of litigating
willfulness.
D. The Standard of Proof for Willfulness in Other Contexts is
Preponderance of the Evidence
Federal trademark law provides for the recovery of attorney’s
fees, increased damages, and the defendant’s profits for willful
infringement.56 In Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, the First Circuit
addressed the issue of whether willfulness should be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.57
The court noted that “authority in other circuits is divided on whether
in Lanham Act cases to equate fraud or willfulness with a heightened

53. Id.
54. Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
Airtex Corp. v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 155 (7th Cir. 1976)).
55. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2013).
57. 684 F.3d 187, 190–93 (1st Cir. 2012).
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standard of proof”58 and concluded that preponderance of the evidence
was the proper standard.59 The Fishman court reasoned that “the
ordinary rule in civil cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence”
where “the text of [the statute] does not prescribe a different burden of
proof.”60 The court noted that even though fraud was “a cousin to
willfulness” and was historically shown by clear and convincing
evidence, “the modern tendency in the Supreme Court is to reserve the
clear and convincing burden, unless dictated by statute, for matters with
constitutional implications like civil commitment.”61 Citing various
Supreme Court decisions for support, the Fishman court observed that
preponderance of the evidence was the appropriate standard for the
“imposition of even severe civil sanctions.”62
Copyright law also provides for increased damages for willful
infringement.63 As with trademark infringement, courts only require a
preponderance of the evidence to establish that infringement was
willful.64 Various courts have found willfulness provisions elsewhere
to require only a preponderance of the evidence, including willful and
malicious injury caused to a debtor,65 willful misappropriation of trade
secrets,66 willful violation of the EPA,67 willful violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act,68 and willful discrimination.69

58. Id. at 193.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 192 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 193 (emphasis added) (citing Herman, 459 U.S. at 390 (1983) (anti-fraud
provision of the Securities Exchange Act); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991)
(Bankruptcy Code fraud provision)).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2013).
64. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Cable, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that plaintiff must prove willful copyright infringement by a
preponderance of the evidence); Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions Civil 17.27
(2007), available at http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD
/Civil_Jury_Instructions_2014_6.pdf.
65. Ahern v. Brackney (In re Brackney), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 958, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
Mar. 14, 2013).
66. Agilent Techs. v. Kirkland, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, at *67 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010).
67. Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions, Eighth Circuit 6.20 (2013), available at
http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/Manual_Civil_Jury_Inst_FJPI8CIV_2013_ed.pdf.
68. Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
69. Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions Civil 11.7B (2007), available at
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil_Jury_Instructions_
2014_6.pdf.
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E. The Punitive Nature of Treble Damages Does Not Support
the Use of the Clear and Convincing Evidence
Standard of Proof
Certain decisions post-Shatterproof have attempted to support the
adoption of a clear and convincing standard on the theory that treble
damages are typically awarded only in punitive cases, which require a
higher standard of proof.70 The Supreme Court has specifically rejected
this notion, stating that “[t]here has never been any general commonlaw rule that the threshold for punitive damages must always be higher
than that for compensatory liability.”71 The Sixth Circuit also rejected
this position in White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co.72
As the White court observed, the concern that punitive damages will be
assessed against the wrong party is addressed by the state of mind
required, not the evidentiary standard.73 Just because the law punishes
malicious behavior it does not necessarily demand a higher standard of
proof to show the existence of that behavior. As for § 284, the Federal
Circuit has already addressed the question of the type of behavior that
subjects a party to possible treble damages by raising the required
showing for willfulness from a standard that was “more akin to
negligence” to [objective] recklessness.74
F. Statutory Adoption Does Not Support the Clear and
Convincing Evidence Standard of Proof
Supreme Court guidance provides another potential reason to
deviate from the assumption that preponderance of the evidence is the
proper standard under § 284: statutory adoption.75 Statutory adoption
occurs when Congress, in choosing to use particular language in a
70. See, e.g., Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“Thus willful infringement must be established by clear and convincing evidence, for it is a
punitive finding, and can have the consequence of multiplication of damages.”) (citations
omitted).
71. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 53 (1983).
72. 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“The dissenting opinion states that punitive
damages are an unconventional form of relief and therefore deserve a heightened standard of
proof. Unquestionably, punitive damages serve a different purpose than compensatory damages.
The requirement that punitive damages be awarded only when a defendant acts maliciously or
recklessly recognizes this difference in purpose and ensures that punitive damages will be awarded
only in the most egregious cases. Punitive damages are not, however, unconventional in the sense
that they are a new or nontraditional form of relief. In fact, punitive damages have a long history
in American civil litigation, where the traditional standard of proof has been ‘preponderance of
the evidence.’”).
73. Id.
74. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
75. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46 (2011).
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statute, incorporates the established common-law meaning of that
language.76 This established meaning might imply a higher standard in
the common law. The Supreme Court examined this in the context of
the standard of proof for invalidating a patent in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
Ltd. Partnership.77 In that case, Microsoft argued that nothing in the
statute required a defendant to invalidate a patent by clear and
convincing evidence.78 The Court noted that 35 U.S.C. § 282 contained
a “presumed validity” of patents and this language was directly adopted
from a prior Supreme Court decision that had required a higher
standard to invalidate a patent.79 By adopting the same “presumed
valid” language in the Patent Act of 1952, the Court concluded that
Congress must have adopted the common law meaning that patents
could only be invalidated upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence.80
An examination of § 284 reveals no special language regarding a
presumption or the presence of any other legal construct that would
indicate that Congress had adopted a common law standard of proof
that deviated from the default preponderance of the evidence. The
increased damages provision of § 284 merely dictates that the court
“may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.”81 In fact, § 284 does not mention willful infringement at all,
which has led at least one Federal Circuit Judge to argue that the willful
infringement requirement was improperly “engraft[ed]” onto § 284 and
that the decision to enhance damages should simply be left to the
discretion of the district court.82 Also, the statute does not contain any
language that was adopted by Congress from court cases that required
a higher standard of proof in order to obtain treble damages. The purely
discretionary nature of the language indicates the opposite, as the
Supreme Court similarly concluded in Octane Fitness with respect to
§ 285.83

76. Id.
77. Id. at 2245–52.
78. Id. at 2244.
79. Id. at 2245–46.
80. Id.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013).
82. Id.; In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
83. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014).
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IV. SECTION 284 ENHANCED DAMAGES DETERMINATION IS AN ISSUE
OF FACT
The Federal Circuit has traditionally treated enhanced damages
under § 284 as a two prong issue: first, a determination is made of the
factual predicate for enhanced damages, typically willful
infringement,84 and second, a discretionary determination is made as to
the amount, if any, of enhanced damages to be awarded, up to a
statutory maximum of three times the original award.85 Supreme Court
analysis on the awarding of damages in intellectual property
infringement cases suggests that both of these prongs, contrary to the
current practice, should be determined by a jury.
A. The Factual Predicate of Whether the Infringement was
Willful Is a Pure Question of Fact
Historically, courts, including the Federal Circuit, have treated the
willfulness determination under § 284 as entirely a question of fact for
the jury.86 However, the Federal Circuit recently began treating the
willfulness determination as a partial question of law for the court as
opposed to entirely a question of fact for the jury.87 In Bard Peripheral
Vascular v. W.L. Gore & Associates, while acknowledging that, “[t]he
ultimate question of willfulness has long been treated as a question of
fact,” the Federal Circuit stated that Seagate—which required an
objective analysis of whether an infringer acted reasonably in
considering willfulness—required a modification to the § 284
analysis.88 The Bard court noted that this analysis requires an
“assessment of potential defenses based on the risk presented by the
patent,” which might entail questions of validity that “are not
necessarily dependent on the factual circumstances of the particular
party accused of infringement.”89 The court then cited Miller v. Fenton
and Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. for the proposition that
sometimes mixed questions of fact and law are treated as a question of
law where “[the court] is better positioned to decide the issue in
84. There is some disagreement as to whether a showing of willfulness is necessary for
obtaining enhanced damages under § 284, but that is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g.,
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (stating that the Federal Circuit has erred by
limiting enhanced damages to findings of willful infringement).
85. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368.
86. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1004–06
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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question.”90 The Bard court concluded that willfulness should be
treated as a two-part analysis, the first part of which may be a question
of law to be handled by the judge, because “the court is in the best
position for making the determination of reasonableness even . . .
though predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact.”91
1. The Bard Court Failed to Engage in the Necessary
Seventh Amendment Analysis
While the Bard court cited Markman as support for its holding that
mixed questions of fact and law are sometimes appropriate for the
judge, it failed to engage in the Seventh Amendment analysis
conducted in Markman. First, one must inquire whether there was a
common law right to have a jury decide the issue that existed prior to
the Seventh Amendment, which was passed in 1791.92 A review of preSeventh Amendment law does not reveal whether a jury was expected
to determine if patent infringement was willful.93 However, an
examination of willful infringement decisions after 1791 shows that
there has never been even a mild debate about who should decide
willfulness.94 It has always been a question of fact for the jury.
Additionally, because willful infringement is merely a type of
infringement, one would expect that a jury would determine this
issue.95 That the issue of willfulness in patent infringement litigation
directly relates to the damages awarded makes it even more likely to
fall under the purview of the jury. As discussed by the Supreme Court
in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., “there is
overwhelming evidence that the consistent practice at common law
[prior to 1791] was for juries to award damages.”96

90. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1985)); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)).
91. Id. at 1006–07.
92. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
93. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Commentary: Willful Patent Infringement and the Federal
Circuit’s Pending En Banc Decision in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 218, 224 (2004) (reviewing pre-1791 patent law including all the patent cases cited in
Markman and finding no mention of a jury being asked to determine if infringement was willful).
94. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1988); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Hammerquist v. Clarke’s Sheet Metal, Inc., 658 F.2d 1319, 1325–26 (9th Cir. 1981) (commenting
that “willful infringement involves a mental state peculiarly within the realm of jury judgment”).
95. Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 (“[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must
be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”).
96. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353–54 (1998).
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Because there is no direct corollary to pre-1791 patent law, which
lacks an analogous willfulness provision, a review of the closest 18thcentury analogue is the next step,97 which in this case appears to be
willful copyright infringement.98 In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, the
Supreme Court examined whether “the Seventh Amendment grants a
right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory
damages.”99 This case dealt with damages that were awarded upon a
finding of “willful infringement.”100 After engaging in exactly the same
analysis it performed in Markman, the Court found that “the Seventh
Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an
award of statutory damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act,
including the amount itself.”101 Critically, this holding was based on the
Court’s finding that there was a common law, pre-Seventh Amendment
right to have a jury determine and set damages in a copyright dispute.102
Such a finding suggests that the factfinder should also be the entity
responsible for determining whether patent infringement is willful.
This would be consistent with willfulness determinations in other areas
of law.103
Bard’s holding also goes directly against a long tradition of
leaving questions of reasonableness to the factfinder. The Supreme
Court has observed that reasonableness is ultimately a question of fact
by recognizing the “jury’s unique competence in applying the
‘reasonable man’ standard.”104 The Federal Circuit has also recognized
the role the jury has in determining whether an infringer had a
reasonable belief that accused activity did not violate the law.105
97. Markman, 517 U.S. at 379–80.
98. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417(1984) (looking
to patent law where there was no precedent in the copyright law “because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (en banc) (looking to willful infringement in the copyright context in an effort to understand
the proper application of willful infringement in the patent context).
99. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342.
100. Id. at 345–46.
101. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 349–55.
103. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 449, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(affirming a jury’s finding of willfulness in a trade dress infringement suit); Segrets, Inc. v.
Gillman Knitwear Co., Inc., 207 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 827 (2000)
(remanding the issue of willfulness in a copyright case so that a jury could determine it).
104. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976).
105. See Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Whether the infringer had a reasonable belief that the accused activity did not violate the law is
a question of fact, as are other questions relevant to the issue of willfulness.”) (citations omitted);
see also Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 295 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1961) (emphasizing that

JACKMAN & WISNIA EDITS.DOCX

476

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

5/11/2015 2:08 PM

[Vol. 31

To justify its departure from longstanding tradition, Bard cites to
previous findings by the Federal Circuit that the objective prong
applied in § 284 is the same as the one applied in § 285 and that § 285
“must be interpreted against the background of the Supreme Court’s
decision in [PRE].”106 In PRE, the court analogized “sham litigation”
to “a lack of probable cause to institute an unsuccessful civil
lawsuit.”107 The Bard court took this one step further by observing that
in the criminal context the Supreme Court has held that “probable
cause” is subject to de novo review even though it deals with questions
of both fact and law.108
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Octane that the
analytical framework of PRE is not applicable to § 285.109 This finding
undermines Bard’s belief that PRE’s connection to § 285 supports its
holding with respect to § 284. Moreover, the Court’s Highmark
decision, which found that “the § 285 inquiry . . . is, at heart, rooted in
factual determinations,”110 in no way supports Bard’s suggestion that
willfulness is a partial legal question for the court. The Bard court fails
to provide a sufficient basis for changing what “has long been treated
as a question of fact”111 to a question of law simply because the
standard has increased from negligence to recklessness.
B. The Discretionary Award of Enhanced Damages Is an Issue
for the Jury
The determination, upon a finding of willful patent infringement,
of whether to enhance damages and in what amount is currently viewed
as a task for the judge.112 At first glance, this appears to be consistent
with the statute that provides “the court may increase the damages up
to three times the amount found or assessed.”113 However, a similar
analysis as the one done for the first prong of the enhanced damages
test under § 284 suggests that this discretionary determination is also a
task for the jury. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Feltner considered
“when dissimilar inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, or when the facts are in dispute,
‘reasonableness’ is a jury question”).
106. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. WL Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
107. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 62–63
(1993).
108. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1008 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996)).
109. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757.
110. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749.
111. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1006.
112. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
113. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013) (emphasis added).
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whether there was a Seventh Amendment right to have a jury determine
copyright statutory damages, which included potential enhancement
for willful infringement.114 The relevant copyright statute contained
similar language to § 284 stating “[i]n a case where the copyright owner
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement
was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the
award of statutory damages.”115 The Supreme Court found “[t]he word
‘court’ in this context appears to mean judge, not jury.”116 The Supreme
Court thus held that it “discern[ed] no statutory right to a jury trial when
a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages. Accordingly, we
must reach the constitutional question.”117
The Court then went through the historical analysis described
above and concluded that there was a constitutional right to a jury on
the question. Specifically, the court found that before 1791 damages in
intellectual property cases were set by a jury.118 This fact led the Feltner
court to conclude that even though the statute on willful copyright
infringement directs the “court” to determine the amount of damages
to award the plaintiff, under the Seventh Amendment there is a
constitutional right to have the jury make this determination.119
Despite the fact that § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, 120 as written,
appeared to be unconstitutional, it was not stricken. Rather, it has
merely been interpreted with the judicial gloss that, despite its actual
text, there is a right to have a jury determine the statutory damages.121
In rejecting the argument that statutory copyright damages were no
longer available because the Supreme Court had struck the statute as
unconstitutional in Feltner, the Ninth Circuit held:
According to Feltner, if the Court finds that § 504(c) [of the
Copyright Act] is constitutionally infirm because it fails to provide
for a jury trial, then the Court must strike down § 504(c) in its
entirety and wait for Congress to re-enact § 504(c) with a jury trial
provision included. This argument fails to understand the Supreme
Court's holding in this case. In Feltner, the Supreme Court held that
114. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–53 (1998).
115. Id. at 343–44.
116. Id. at 346.
117. Id. at 347.
118. Id. at 351–53.
119. Id. at 353–56 (“The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury determine the
amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner.”) (emphasis in original).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2013).
121. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Krypton Broad., 259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.
2001) (the appeal following the remand to the trial court for a jury trial on damages following the
Supreme Court’s Feltner decision).
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§ 504(c) provides a remedy for copyright infringement, and the
Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial when that
remedy is at issue.122

Given the strong historical and statutory correlation between
patent and copyright law, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Feltner does
not leave a lot of room for a different conclusion as it relates to the
discretionary determination of the damage amount under § 284.123
Accordingly, the entire § 284 inquiry is likely a matter for the jury.
Moreover, § 284 should not be struck, but simply interpreted to
preserve the right to a jury, as has been done post-Feltner.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LOWERING THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
FOR WILLFULNESS AND PUTTING THE RELATED DISCRETIONARY
QUESTIONS IN THE HANDS OF THE JURY
Lowering the evidentiary standard from clear and convincing to a
preponderance of the evidence has the obvious effect—all else being
equal—of making it more likely that a patent holder will be able to
make a willfulness showing. Allowing juries instead of judges to decide
whether to award enhanced damages and, if so, the amount has other
implications. The most significant potential impacts fall under two
main categories: (1) the change in litigation tactics used to defend
against claims of willful infringement and (2) the change in the
expected outcome of these pursuits.
A. The Potential Change in Litigation Tactics
Litigation tactics are likely to change if juries decide the question
of enhanced damages under § 284. This is due to the fact that the
defendant’s litigation conduct has historically been considered in
setting such damages. Read v. Portec set out nine factors to be
considered, including “the infringer’s behavior in the litigation.”124 If

122. Id. at 1192.
123. One alternative to viewing § 284, as it is currently written, as unconstitutional is to read
“court” as referring to the jury, a route Justice Scalia chose to take. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 356
(Scalia, J., concurring).
124. The other Read factors include:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; (2)
whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent, investigated the patent
and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3)
the infringer’s size and financial condition; (4) the closeness of the case; (5) the
duration of the misconduct; (6) the remedial action by the infringer; (7) the
infringer’s motivation for harm; and (8) whether the infringer attempted to conceal
its misconduct.
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defendants know that a jury will be considering their litigation behavior
in the context of enhanced damages they will likely shift their behavior.
Judges, unlike juries, are likely immunized to a certain extent by some
of the more abusive litigation tactics that parties use. Defendants may
curb the common practice of asserting every conceivable defense and
position pre-trial only to dramatically narrow their case at trial to a
small subset of these issues. For example, it is common for defendants
to assert dozens if not hundreds of prior art references pre-trial, but only
assert one to three of them at trial. It may be more difficult for an
infringer to explain to a jury that it truly believed the patent was invalid
or not infringed after abandoning dozens of “defenses” pre-trial. This
concern may make bifurcation of willfulness more likely as well.
Another possible shift in behavior relates to a second Read factor:
“whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent, investigated
the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it
was not infringed.”125 While judges routinely apply Knorr-Bremse,
which removed the adverse inference that a legal opinion on
infringement would have been unfavorable if an attorney was not
consulted as to infringement,126 parties may believe that a jury might
be less capable of engaging in such a legal fiction. Defendants thus
might be more inclined to present evidence of consultation with outside
counsel to a jury—risking potential waiver—than if a judge was the
decision maker.
Finally, defendants might curtail or modify their behavior during
litigation because of the perception that juries are more likely to utilize
punitive measures and implement these measures to a greater degree.127
This might motivate defendants to try harder to establish they were the
more reasonable party in the litigation and need not be punished. This
raises another question: how will an increased reliance on juries impact
the outcome of disputes over willful infringement and enhanced
damages?

Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (summarizing the factors
found in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
125. Id.
126. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also 35 U.S.C. § 298 (2013).
127. See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2004).
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B. Potential Changes as to the Likelihood and Size of Enhanced
Damages
Relying on a jury instead of a judge for determining enhanced
damages has the potential to change the likelihood of a decision to
award damages and, if so, the size of such an award. An empirical study
published in 2012 showed that prior to In re Seagate, which added the
“evidence that infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood
that its action constituted infringement” test to a finding of
willfulness,128 judges and juries both found willful infringement at
roughly equal rates (54% and 61%, respectively).129 However, in the
years after Seagate, jury findings of willfulness remained at about the
same rate (62%), while judicial findings of willfulness plummeted to
less than 19%.130 While the sample size was not tremendous—there
were only 111 post-Seagate determinations of willfulness in the study,
only a small portion of which were judicial findings131—the difference
may be statistically significant in suggesting that increased reliance on
juries will result in more findings of willful infringement. However,
part of the shift in willfulness findings is due to an increase in summary
judgment findings as to willfulness, as well as JMOL findings of no
willfulness.132 As such, some of the recently observed reduction in
willfulness allegations ultimately resulting in an award of treble
damages at trial would remain even if the jury’s role in the process was
increased.133
As to the size of a potential § 284 award, there is some evidence
that juries are more likely to award punitive damages and also more
likely to award such damages at the higher end of the allowable scale.134
To that end, putting willfulness and enhanced damages findings in the
hands of the jury will likely result in an increase in damages being
awarded at the upper end of the allowable scale. However, unlike the
copyright act, which provides little guidance on the amount of statutory
damages for willful infringement (which under § 504(c) range from
128. In re Seagate, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
129. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement & Enhanced Damages After In Re
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 445 (2012). Note that this data only looked
at decisions at the district court level, however it includes final determinations under all procedural
postures except default judgment.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 440.
134. See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 127 (finding that most $100+ million punitive
awards are the result of jury trials).
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$750–$150,000 per act—or 200 times the base amount), there is a wellestablished jurisprudence for determining patent damages that are
rationally connected to the infringing activity and a willfulness finding
can result in no more than a trebling of that amount.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding 35 U.S.C. § 284
likely needs to be revisited, as recognized by at least two Federal
Circuit judges.135 For at least the first 170 years after Congress provided
discretion, judges did not require clear and convincing evidence to
obtain treble damages for patent infringement. Additionally, the various
statutes relating to this provision have never mentioned or called for
this evidentiary standard. Further, the language Congress selected when
drafting § 284 does not indicate an intent to adopt a common-law
standard that exceeds the preponderance of the evidence.
The Federal Circuit’s adoption of “clear and convincing
evidence” for § 284 goes against the Supreme Court’s repetitions over
the last forty years that civil litigation, even in the context of punitive
remedies, should be governed by the preponderance of the evidence
unless a governing statute requires otherwise. The proper standard of
proof for § 284 is likely the preponderance of the evidence.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s recent holding in Bard, that the
objective prong of a willfulness determination under § 284 is a question
of law for the court subject to de novo review,136 should likely be
reconsidered. The Bard court failed to justify its deviation from the
long practice of treating willfulness as an issue of fact for the jury to
resolve. Its statement that the judge is best suited to determine the
objective reasonableness of the behavior of accused infringers, even
when this determination is based on mixed questions of fact and law, is
opposed by the longstanding American practice of putting that
determination in the hands of the factfinder. The Bard court’s reliance
on § 285 and PRE as justification for its holding is now likely
unsupported in light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in
Highmark and Octane.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Feltner on the award
of statutory damages for willful copyright infringement suggests that
not only should the factual predicate of willfulness be determined by a
135. Judge Hughes joined Judge O’Malley’s concurrence in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs.,
Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383–86 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
136. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1004–06 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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jury, but also that the decision of whether to award enhanced damages,
and if so, the amount, is a task for the jury.
Finally, there are several implications if these suggested changes
to § 284 jurisprudence are adopted. A lowered standard of proof would
likely increase willfulness findings, but it remains to be seen if this
increase would offset the increased summary judgment findings and
successful JMOLs dismissing willfulness that have taken place postSeagate. Similarly, a shift to relying on juries for enhanced damages
determinations may also increase the likelihood of a willfulness
finding, as well as the size of the damages awarded. Another possible
effect is a decrease in abusive pre-trial tactics by defendants, for fear of
the jury learning of them. Defendants might also be more willing to
present evidence of a reliance on the advice of counsel to a jury, despite
the jurisprudence dictating that this no longer creates an adverse
inference. Fear of increased damages as set by a jury may incentivize
defendants to make a greater effort to appear as the reasonable party
who does not merit punishment.

